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Abstract 
This six-wave multi-informant longitudinal study on Dutch adolescents (N = 824; age 12-18) 
examined the interplay of socioeconomic status with parental monitoring in predicting minor 
delinquency. Fixed-effects negative binomial regression analyses revealed that this interplay is 
different within adolescents across time than between adolescents. Between individuals, parental 
solicitation and control were not significantly associated with delinquency after controlling for SES: 
Adolescents whose parents exercised more monitoring did not offend less than others. Within 
individuals, higher levels of parental control were unexpectedly associated with more delinquency, 
but this relation was dependent on SES: Low-SES adolescents, but not high-SES adolescents, 
offended more during periods in which their parents exercised more control than during other 
periods with less control. In contrast to earlier work, this finding suggests that monitoring could be 
least effective when needed most. Low-SES parents might not use monitoring effectively and 
become overcontrolling when their child goes astray.  
 
Keywords:   adolescent delinquency, parental monitoring, socioeconomic status, neighborhoods, 
within-individual 
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The Interplay of Parental Monitoring and Socioeconomic Status in Predicting Minor Delinquency 
Between and Within Adolescents 
Parents commonly aim to prevent their adolescent offspring from engaging in risky 
activities. To this end, they can monitor adolescents  activities and whereabouts (Dishion & 
McMahon, 1998). For example, parents can ask questions and encourage their children to disclose 
information (Stattin & Kerr, 2000), which is known as parental solicitation. Parents can also 
demand to be informed by setting monitoring rules, which is known as parental control. Following 
up on research suggesting that monitoring may not be as effective as previously assumed (Racz & 
McMahon, 2011; Smetana, 2008; Stattin & Kerr, 2000), some more recent studies examined for 
whom monitoring is effective and under what circumstances. This literature indicates that whereas 
monitoring may be most effective when adolescents are exposed to risk factors for problem 
behavior, it may be ineffective or even counter effective in the absence of risk factors (e.g., Kiesner, 
Poulin, & Dishion, 2010; Laird, Marrero, & Sentse, 2010). This longitudinal study on Dutch 
adolescents (age 12-18) therefore examined the interplay of parental monitoring with arguably the 
most classic risk factor for problem behavior: a low socioeconomic status (Merton, 1968). 
Specifically, we investigated whether the association of minor delinquency with parental 
solicitation and control would be more beneficial for low-SES adolescents. Additionally, we 
examined whether this hypothesized moderation is specific for parents  monitoring efforts, or 
whether it also applies to adolescent disclosure of information (Stattin & Kerr, 2000). 
In terms of design, this study expanded upon existing research by investigating all 
associations both between adolescents and within adolescents. A between-individual association 
means that adolescents who are monitored more, commit less offenses compared to other 
adolescents who are monitored less. Contrarily, a within-individual association implies that the 
same adolescents reveal less problem behavior during periods with more monitoring than during 
periods with less monitoring. Unraveling how changes in monitoring co-occur with concurrent 
THE INTERPLAY OF MONITORING AND SES 4 
fluctuations in delinquency may provide more relevant information for parents and practitioners, 
compared to studying differences between individuals (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009; Voelke, 
Brose, Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2014). 
Parental Monitoring and Adolescent Delinquency 
As adolescents enter middle school, they start to spend relatively more time with friends and 
less with their family (Larson & Richards, 1991). Consequently, parents have fewer opportunities to 
supervise their activities (Dishion & McMahon, 1998). Among peers, many adolescents experiment 
with risky behaviors, such as minor delinquency and substance use (Moffitt, 1993). Parents thus 
have to meet the challenge to protect their children from risky behavior, while at the same time 
promoting their autonomy. One strategy to accomplish this balance is to monitor adolescents  
activities.  
The effectiveness of monitoring has been a topic of scientific debate. There are theoretical 
reasons to believe that monitoring may be effective in preventing problem behavior, but it can also 
be reasoned that it may be ineffective or even counter effective. Monitoring could be effective 
because it may enable parents to stay involved, without being physically present (Dishion & 
McMahon, 1998). To the extent that adolescents accept this involvement, it may prevent them from 
engaging in risky activities. Contrarily, monitoring may be ineffective because adolescents may 
perceive it as a form of overprotection or privacy invasion (Anonymous, 2008; Kakihara & 
Tilton‐Weaver, 2009). Adolescents typically develop a growing desire for autonomy (Anonymous, 
2001) and may therefore perceive their parents  monitoring efforts as a threat to their independence. 
In this case, monitoring may even become counter effective (Kerr & Stattin, 2000) since it may be 
precisely this desire for autonomy that motivates many adolescents to experiment with delinquency 
(Agnew, 1984). Theoretically, such harmful effects of monitoring may therefore be expected 
particularly for more controlling monitoring strategies (Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009; Soenens & 
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Vansteenkiste, 2010). Consequently, parental control may have a stronger potential for harmful 
effects than parental solicitation.  
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring is mixed and varies between different 
monitoring strategies and research designs. Between-individual studies suggested that parental 
monitoring is indirectly linked to less problem behavior via more disclosure by adolescents 
(Fletcher, Steinberg, & Williams‐Wheeler, 2004; Klevens & Hall, 2014; Soenens, Vansteenkiste, 
Luyckx, & Goossens, 2006; Vieno, Nation, Pastore, & Santinello, 2009; Willoughby & Hamza, 
2011). This suggests that parents  efforts to obtain information from children could preclude 
delinquency at least partly because children indeed disclose information in response. Consequently, 
studies that examined solicitation while controlling for disclosure typically revealed null results 
(Anonymous, 2010; Tilton-Weaver, Burk, Kerr, & Stattin, 2013) or even found that solicitation was 
related to more problem behavior (Anonymous, 2015; Kerr, Stattin, & Burk, 2010; Kiesner, 
Dishion, Poulin, & Pastore, 2009; Stattin & Kerr, 2000; Willoughby & Hamza, 2011). Contrarily, 
parental control was still found to be associated with less problem behavior after controlling for 
disclosure in some studies (Stattin & Kerr, 2000; Tilton-Weaver et al., 2013; Willoughby & Hamza, 
2011), but not in other studies (Anonymous, 2010; Kerr et al., 2010; Kiesner et al., 2009).  
In sum, although these between-individual studies suggest that monitoring is related to less 
problem behavior, this effect often disappeared or reversed after controlling for disclosure. By 
including disclosure as a control variable, many studies have essentially examined the effect of 
monitoring that is not accompanied by adolescent disclosure. These studies  adverse effects suggest 
that a situation in which parents ask more, but adolescents do not tell more, may indicate 
involvement in problem behavior. Potentially, parents ask more questions in these situations (e.g., 
solicitation), precisely because they suspect that their child may be withholding information about 
risky activities (e.g., lack of disclosure). If disclosure indeed mediates the beneficial effects of 
monitoring (e.g., Soenens et al., 2006), mainly harmful effects (e.g., due to privacy invasion) may 
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be visible after controlling for disclosure. Therefore, we examined monitoring effects before 
controlling for disclosure in this study.  In sum, our first hypothesis (H1) was that adolescents 
whose parents exercise more solicitation and control engage in less delinquent behavior than other 
adolescents who are monitored less (i.e., between-individual effect). 
Despite this abundance of between-individual studies, little evidence is available on within-
individual associations between parental monitoring and delinquency. While other aspects of 
parent-child relationships (e.g., parental knowledge and involvement) were found to be associated 
with delinquency within adolescents across time (e.g, Farrington, Loeber, Yin, & Anderson, 2002; 
Lam, McHale, & Crouter, 2014; Anonymous, 2015), most studies that focused on monitoring have 
predominantly investigated between-individual variation (e.g., cross-sectional studies or cross-
lagged models; Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). If monitoring indeed encourages adolescents 
to engage less in problem behavior, it seems likely that they would offend less during those periods 
in which their parents monitor them more. A recent study, using about one third of the current 
sample1, examined such within-individual effects of monitoring on delinquency (Anonymous, 
2015). This study revealed no significant within-individual linkages between monitoring and 
delinquency. 
In sum, the present study was among the first to examine within-individual associations 
between delinquency and monitoring. Despite the lack of prior research, we hypothesized (H2) on 
theoretical grounds that adolescents offend less during periods in which their parents exercise more 
solicitation and control than during other periods with less monitoring (i.e., within-individual 
effect). Moreover, we examined adolescents  disclosure (H3), which has consistently been 
associated with less problem behavior (e.g., Anonymous, 2010; Kerr et al., 2010).  
The Interplay of Monitoring and Socioeconomic Status 
Given that research findings on monitoring are not entirely consistent, recent studies have 
examined for whom monitoring may be effective and under what circumstances. Theoretically, it 
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can be reasoned that monitoring is most effective when it is required by situational demands (Laird 
et al., 2010). For adolescents in high-risk environments, being protected by parents may be more 
important than perceiving autonomy. In these contexts, the benefits of monitoring may therefore 
outweigh the risk of perceived overprotection or privacy invasion. Adolescents may also be more 
likely to accept the legitimacy of monitoring in high-risk contexts (McElhaney & Allen, 2001). 
Contrarily, adolescents in low-risk environments may more often perceive their parents  monitoring 
efforts as intrusive. Supporting this hypothesis, several between-individual studies have indeed 
suggested that whereas monitoring may be effective when adolescents are at risk for problem 
behavior, it may be ineffective or counter effective in the absence of risk factors such as 
unsupervised time and delinquent friends (Laird et al., 2010; Anonymous, 2009; Kiesner et al., 
2010; Stattin & Kerr, 2000).  
Given that a low SES is among the core risk factors of delinquency literature (e.g., Merton, 
1968; Bjerk, 2007; Anonymous, 2015) and that monitoring has often appeared most effective in the 
presence of such risk factors, it seems plausible that the effect of monitoring may similarly be 
moderated by SES. The benefits of monitoring may outweigh the risk of perceived intrusion for 
low-SES adolescents, whereas the opposite could be true for high-SES adolescents. Potentially, 
more intrusive monitoring strategies such as parental control may therefore even be harmful for 
high-SES adolescents. Research on this potential moderation is presently limited to between-
individual studies on parental knowledge about their children, as opposed to the active monitoring 
strategies distinguished by Stattin & Kerr (2000). These studies (Beyers, Bates, Pettit, & Dodge, 
2011; Pettit, Bates, Dodge, & Meece, 1999; Rankin & Quane 2002; Roche & Leventhal, 2009) have 
generally revealed a stronger between-individual association of more parental knowledge with less 
problem behavior among adolescents living in low-SES neighborhoods. The present study 
examined such a moderating role of SES within individuals over time. If monitoring is indeed more 
important for youths who are at risk for problem behavior, we may expect that especially low-SES 
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adolescents offend less during periods in which their parents solicit and control more than during 
other periods with less monitoring. 
In sum, the present study examined the interplay of SES with parental monitoring both 
between and within individuals. We hypothesized (H4) that the expected beneficial association of 
solicitation and control with delinquency would be stronger for low-SES adolescents than for high-
SES adolescents. Contrarily, we did not expect such a moderating effect of SES for adolescents  
disclosure of information. Whereas parental monitoring may plausibly be perceived as intrusive by 
high-SES adolescents, this reasoning does not apply to voluntary disclosure.  
The Present Study 
In conclusion, this study examined the interplay between monitoring and SES in predicting 
delinquency, both between adolescents and within adolescents. We expected delinquency to be 
associated with lower levels of parental solicitation and control between adolescents (H1) and 
potentially also within adolescents over time (H2). Furthermore, we hypothesized that delinquency 
would be associated with lower levels of adolescent disclosure (H3). Finally, we hypothesized that 
the beneficial association of solicitation and control, but not disclosure, with delinquency would be 
stronger among low-SES adolescents (H4).  
Method 
Sample 
Analyses were conducted on six waves from the longitudinal Research on Adolescent 
Development and Relationships  (RADAR) study. Participants were 824 adolescents and their 
parents. Questionnaires were confidentially administered during annual home visits, for which the 
family received about $150 per visit. Parents provided written informed consent for their family s 
participation. A first cohort (N = 327; known as RADAR Old and as CONAMORE Family Sample) 
was first interviewed in 2001, while a second cohort was first interviewed in 2005 (N = 497; known 
as RADAR Young). All respondents were enrolled in the first year of secondary education during 
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the first wave (Mage = 12.7; SDage = 0.62). The first two waves of the 2001 cohort were excluded 
from the analyses, due to the absence of parent reports on monitoring. The sample consisted of 
53.6% boys and 46.4% girls. Adolescents  educational level was distributed 25.8% lower 
vocational, 33.5% higher vocational, and 40.7% pre-academic. Parents  educational level was 
27.0% lower vocational, 39.5%, higher vocational, and 33.5% academic. These distributions 
indicate that respondents had a higher average SES than the general population of the Netherlands 
(CBS, 2005). Furthermore, nearly all respondents were of native Dutch ethnicity. Differences 
between the RADAR sample and the general population of the Netherlands can be attributed to the 
geographical restriction to the Utrecht province and nearby cities, an inclusion criteria of a good 
Dutch language comprehension, and the exclusion of single parent families. 
Measures 
Delinquency. At each wave, delinquency was measured as the variety count of offenses that 
an adolescent committed during the previous year. Adolescents self-reported these offenses on a 32-
item scale of illegal behaviors that included the use of drugs, but not the use of alcohol or tobacco. 
Items were based on the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (Junger-Tas, Terlouw, & 
Klein 1994) and validated for Dutch adolescents in previous studies (Baerveldt, Van Rossem, & 
Vermande, 2003). An example of an item is “During the past year, did you steal something from a 
shop worth over 5 euro?  Nearly all reported behaviors were relatively minor offenses such as 
vandalism, shoplifting, and drug use. For the 2001 cohort, a shortened scale was administered 
during waves 3, 4 and 5. This 16-item questionnaire covered the same offenses, but with less 
specificity. For example, it included only a single item on shoplifting (i.e., stealing something), 
whereas the main questionnaire included two items (i.e., stealing something under and over 5 euro). 
During the fifth wave, 233 respondents completed both the shortened and the complete scale. The 
association between both scales was strong (r = .84). To adjust for the smaller number of items in 
the shortened questionnaire, scores were rescaled to the metric of the full questionnaire using the 
THE INTERPLAY OF MONITORING AND SES 10 
following formula: estimated score on full questionnaire = 0.41 + 1.03 * score on shortened 
questionnaire’. The coefficients of this formula were obtained from a regression analysis among the 
233 respondents who completed both questionnaires to make sure that the rescaled scores reflect the 
best possible estimates of the score that respondents would have obtained if they had completed the 
full questionnaire.  
Monitoring and disclosure. This study combined multi-informant data on monitoring and 
disclosure from three different reporters into a single composite score for every adolescent. 
Solicitation, control, and disclosure were reported by adolescents, mothers, and fathers. Scores of 
mothers and fathers were first averaged into a parent report, while reports of adolescents on mothers 
and fathers were averaged into an adolescent report2. The parent and adolescent reports were in turn 
averaged to obtain a single score on each construct that equally reflects the perspective of 
adolescents and both parents. Items were based on the work of Stattin and Kerr (2000). Previous 
studies have demonstrated the validity of these measures for a Dutch sample (Anonymous, 2008). 
Parental solicitation was measured using 3 items, such as: “Do you commonly ask your child to tell 
about things that happened during his/her free time?  Reliability averaged D = .67 across waves for 
mothers, .72 for fathers, and .74 for adolescents. The consistency of reported solicitation averaged r 
= .12 between mothers and fathers and .21 between parents and adolescents. Parental control was 
assessed using 5 items. An example is “Before your child goes out on a Saturday evening, do you 
demand him/her to inform you about where he/she is going and with whom?  Reliability averaged 
D = .85 across waves for mothers, fathers, and adolescents a like. The consistency of reported 
control averaged r = .25 between mothers and fathers and .37 between parents and adolescents. 
Adolescent disclosure was measured using 6 items, for instance: “If you have been away during the 
evening, do you tell your parents what you have done when you come home?  Reliability averaged 
D = .80 across waves for mothers, .77 for fathers, and .77 for adolescents. The consistency of 
reported disclosure averaged r = .47 between mothers and fathers and .50 between parents and 
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adolescents. Solicitation, control, and disclosure were scored on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 
(always) and standardized to facilitate the interpretation of parameter estimates. Because scales  
reliabilities were sufficient, the relatively low consistencies between mothers, fathers, and 
adolescents underline the distinct perspective of each reporter.  
Socioeconomic status. This study distinguished three facets of SES: adolescents  
educational level, parents  educational level, and neighborhood SES. Adolescents  educational level 
constituted the self-reported track in which they were enrolled at the fifth wave. Parental 
educational level was indicated by the highest self-reported educational level completed by either of 
the two parents. Educational level was analyzed as a scale with three scores -1: (lower vocational; 
i.e., VMBO/MBO), 0 (higher vocational, i.e., HAVO/HBO), and 1 (pre-academic, i.e., 
VWO/University). Information on neighborhoods was obtained from the Dutch Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS, 2006; 2011), based on respondents six-digit postal code (comparable to American 
census tracts) at the first wave. Neighborhood SES was a standardized sum score of neighborhoods  
standardized population density, mean fiscal income, and mean property value. In all analyses, we 
specified SES as a single composite by adding standardized scores on parental education, 
neighborhood SES, and adolescent education. Scores on this composite were in turn also 
standardized. 
Strategy of Analysis 
Estimation method. Since our delinquency measure revealed a negative binomial count 
distribution (score 0: 31.4%; score 1: 35.4%; score 2-16: 33.1%; variance-to-mean ratio: 2.4), we 
analyzed data using negative binomial regression analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. 
Analyses were carried out separately between and within adolescents. For the between-individual 
analyses, our goal was to determine if some adolescents offended more than others during the entire 
course of adolescence. For this purpose, we calculated individual mean scores across all waves on 
delinquency, solicitation, control, and disclosure. These means were calculated across all six waves 
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for the 2005 and (due to available data) from wave 3 through wave 6 for the 2001 cohort. For 
delinquency, mean scores were rounded to integers to maintain the count distribution. SES variables 
were time-constant throughout this study. Using these mean scores, we carried out negative 
binomial regression analyses to estimate fully between-individual effects. For the within-individual 
estimation, we used fixed-effects negative binomial regression analyses3 (Hausman, Hall, & 
Griliches, 1984). Fixed-effects models capture only within-individual variation by examining 
changes around respondents  average scores across waves. This allowed us to examine how over-
time fluctuations in monitoring and disclosure co-occurred with parallel fluctuations in 
delinquency.  
  Model specification. Model specification was based on two principles. First, variables  
main effects cannot be estimated in models that also include an interaction term of that variable 
(Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). Second, variables  effects cannot be estimated in a model that 
controls for mediators of these effects (Pearl, 2000). These two principles resulted in a four-step 
model specification. A first model estimated main effects of parental solicitation and control.  
Adolescent disclosure was excluded from this model, because it may mediate beneficial monitoring 
effects4 (Soenens et al., 2006).  A second model added interactions between SES and monitoring. A 
third model added adolescent disclosure and a fourth model subsequently added interactions 
between disclosure and SES.  
Control variables. Using dummy variables, between-individual analyses were controlled 
for gender and cohort (2001/2005). These variables did not require inclusion in the within-
individual analyses, since fixed-effects models automatically control for all time-constant variables. 
Instead, within-individual models were controlled for age (i.e., the age-crime curve; Farrington, 
1986), which was accomplished using a set of dummy variables indicating the wave. To control for 
potential bias from a change in the delinquency questionnaire for the 2001 cohort, a dummy 
variable was added that indicated the administered instrument. In addition, within-individual 
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models included a time-lagged delinquency variable to control for delinquency at the previous 
wave. 
Attrition and missing values. Attrition was low and occurred mainly between wave 5 (91% 
participating) and wave 6 (80% participating). We assessed the amount of missing values across all 
4290 observations: 327 respondents on 4 waves for the 2001 cohort and 497 respondents on 6 
waves for the 2005 cohort. The percentage of missing values on each variable was as follows: 
delinquency 10.4%, socioeconomic status 0.1%, solicitation 9.5%, control 14.8%, and disclosure 
9.5%. An MCAR test revealed a good Chi2/df ratio of 1.43 (Bollen, 1989), which indicates that 
missing values were not strongly associated with scores on other variables. For the between-
individual analyses, all waves with data could be used to calculate respondents  across-wave mean 
scores. A small adjustment was made for waves with missing data to approximate the score that 
respondents would have obtained across all six waves5. Due to the estimation method, all 
respondents who had complete data on at least one wave could be included in the within-individual 
analyses (i.e., complete case analysis in long notation). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all constructs are displayed in Table 1. 
Model specification proceeded in four steps, as displayed in Table 2. To investigate the main effects 
of solicitation and control, a first model was specified without moderating or mediating (i.e., 
disclosure) effects. Between individuals, parental solicitation and control were not significantly 
associated with adolescent delinquency. This rejected our hypothesis (H1) that adolescents whose 
parents exercise more monitoring would offend less than others. Noticeably, both solicitation and 
control revealed a negative bivariate correlation with delinquency (see Table 1), but these 
associations were no longer significant after controlling for gender and SES. 
Within individuals, solicitation revealed no significant effect on delinquency, whereas 
control revealed a positive effect that was opposite to our hypothesis. This rejected our hypothesis 
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(H2) that more monitoring would be associated with less delinquency within adolescents over time. 
Contrarily, adolescents even offended more during periods in which their parents exercised more 
control than during other periods with less control. 
To assess how parental monitoring effects may be moderated by SES, we added interactions 
between SES and monitoring in a second model. Between individuals, we found no significant 
interaction of SES with either solicitation or control. Within individuals, we found a significant 
interaction of SES with parental control. Importantly, this interaction was in the opposite direction 
of what was expected: Higher levels of control co-occurred with higher levels of delinquency 
primarily among low-SES adolescents (see Figure 1). These findings clearly refuted our hypothesis 
(H4) that the association between monitoring and delinquency would be more beneficial for low-
SES adolescents. Contrarily, an interaction was found only within adolescents and in the opposite 
direction. To determine how this interaction may be interpreted, we estimated the effect of parental 
control for low (z-score of -1) and high (z-score of +1) levels of SES using a simple slopes analysis 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). As depicted in Figure 1, this analysis revealed that control 
was associated with more delinquency for low-SES adolescents (b = 0.16, p = .002), but not for 
high-SES adolescents (b = 0.01, p = .862).  
To investigate if interactions with SES are specific to parents  efforts, we specified a third 
model that added adolescent disclosure. As expected (H3), we found a strong negative effect of 
disclosure on delinquency both between and within individuals. In line with previous studies, 
adding disclosure changed the direction of the between-individual effect of solicitation (from -0.07 
to +0.24). In a fourth model (omitted from Table 2), we added and tested an interaction between 
disclosure and SES. In line with our theoretical reasoning that SES moderation is specific to 
parental monitoring, this interaction was non-significant both between and within adolescents. 
Internal Replication 
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To check the reliability of these findings, we performed three additional analyses. First, we 
repeated all analyses separately for adolescent, mother, and father reports (see Appendix A). 
Results demonstrated consistent patterns across reporters. The within-individual effect of parental 
control was significant for mother (b = 0.11, p = .009) and father reports (b = 0.10, p = .016), but 
non-significant for adolescent reports (b = 0.03, p = .501). The within-individual interaction 
between SES and parental control was significant for mother reports (b = -0.08, p = .018), 
marginally significant for father reports (b = -0.06, p = .071), and non-significant for adolescent 
reports (b = -0.04, p = .242). The negative effect of adolescent disclosure on delinquency was 
significant for all three reporters, both between and within adolescents. A formal comparison 
revealed no significant differences in effect sizes between reporters for any of this study s 
significant findings. 
Second, we repeated our analyses with adolescent disclosure as outcome variable (see 
Appendix B). Based on the idea that effects of monitoring on delinquency may be mediated by 
disclosure (e.g., Soenens et al., 2006), we expected that results for disclosure would resemble those 
for delinquency. Consistently, core findings were replicated for adolescent disclosure. Within-
individual analyses revealed the same interaction between SES and parental control that was found 
for adolescent delinquency. However, parental solicitation was decisively associated with more 
adolescent disclosure both between and within individuals, whereas its association with 
delinquency was non-significant. 
Because previous studies focused specifically on between-individual moderation by 
neighborhoods (e.g., Beyers et al., 2011), we finally ran an analysis in which neighborhood quality 
(instead of an SES composite) was specified as a between-individual moderator. In line with 
previous studies, this analysis revealed an interaction (b = 0.11, p = .046) in which more parental 
control was associated with less delinquency particularly in low-SES neighborhoods. This suggests 
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that differences between this study and previous findings are due to the use of multiple SES 
components and particularly within-individual modelling.  
Discussion 
This study examined the interplay between socioeconomic status and parental monitoring in 
predicting minor adolescent delinquency. Results revealed that this interplay is different within 
adolescents across time than between adolescents. Between individuals, parental solicitation and 
control were not significantly associated with adolescent delinquency after controlling for SES. 
Within individuals, higher levels of parental control were unexpectedly associated with higher 
levels of adolescent delinquency, but this relation was dependent on SES: Low-SES adolescents, 
but not high-SES adolescents, offended more during periods in which their parents exercised more 
control than during other periods with less control. Unlike parental monitoring, adolescent 
disclosure was strongly associated with less delinquency both between and within adolescents and 
regardless of SES.  
These results strongly contradicted our hypothesis that monitoring would be related to less 
delinquency. Many previous studies (e.g., Stattin & Kerr, 2000) revealed between-individual 
associations of more solicitation and control with less delinquency. Although this study revealed 
similar correlations at the bivariate level (Table 1), these associations were reduced to non-
significance by controlling for gender and SES. The strongest contradiction with our hypothesis and 
previous literature (e.g., Stattin & Kerr, 2000) was however posed by the finding that control was 
overall linked to more delinquency within individuals. Challenging the idea that monitoring can 
preclude delinquent behavior, this finding implies that adolescents offended more when their 
parents exercised higher levels of control than during other periods with less control. This might 
indicate that adolescent become more delinquent in response to parents  increased control, or that 
parents increase supervision when their children go astray. Unlike delinquency, adolescent 
THE INTERPLAY OF MONITORING AND SES 17 
disclosure was however decisively associated with higher levels of solicitation both between and 
within adolescents, which suggests that solicitation could nonetheless have beneficial effects. 
We see three possible interpretations for the discrepancy between results at the between- and 
the within-individual level. The first is that it could be beneficial when parents consequently 
exercise higher levels of monitoring than other parents from childhood onwards (i.e., between-
individual differences), whereas it could be harmful when the same parents monitor their child more 
than usual during a particular period (i.e., within-individual differences). A second explanation is 
that the association between monitoring and delinquency is not causal, but due to some time-
constant third variable affecting both monitoring and delinquency (e.g., genetic predisposition). 
Unlike between-individual models, within-individual models control for such time-constant third 
variables. In line with this explanation, between-individual associations between monitoring and 
delinquency were no longer significant after controlling for gender and SES. A third interpretation 
of the discrepancy between between-individual and within-individual patterns lies in potential 
harmful dynamics between parenting and problem behavior. For example, Granic and Patterson 
(2006) theorized that families can get trapped in a process in which children s negative behavior 
(e.g., delinquency) provokes coercive parenting (e.g., too much control), which in turn leads to 
more negative behavior. Since such dynamic processes take place within families over time, they 
may be visible particularly at the within-individual level. 
Unlike parental solicitation and control, adolescents  voluntary disclosure was strongly 
associated with less delinquency both between and within adolescents. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that found a within-individual association between parental knowledge and 
delinquency (e.g., Farrington et al., 2002), while also suggesting that these findings may be 
accounted for by disclosure, more than by monitoring. Interestingly, the association between 
solicitation and delinquency reversed after controlling for disclosure. This finding is consistent with 
the idea that beneficial effects of monitoring are mediated by disclosure (Soenens et al., 2006). 
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When parents ask more, but adolescents nonetheless do not tell more (the effect of solicitation 
while keeping disclosure constant), this potentially indicates a heightened engagement in problem 
behavior. Parents could be asking more questions in these situations precisely because they suspect 
that their child may be withholding information about risky activities. 
Besides distinguishing between- and within-individual effects, the main aim of this study 
was to examine how the relation between monitoring and delinquency may depend on SES. Based 
on between-individual analyses, previous studies revealed that monitoring is most likely to be 
associated with less delinquency in high-risk contexts (e.g., Laird et al., 2010). Instead, the present 
study revealed that monitoring interacted with SES only within individuals and in the opposite 
direction. This study therefore challenges claims (e.g., Laird et al., 2010) that monitoring is most 
effective in high-risk environments, by demonstrating that this may be reversed within adolescents 
across time. 
The within-individual finding that higher levels of parental control more often co-occurred 
with higher levels of delinquency among low-SES adolescents than among high-SES adolescents 
was unexpected. One feasible explanation is that high-SES parents more often exercise a warm, 
open, and authoritative style of parenting (Conger, Ge, Elder, Lorenz, & Simons, 1994; Steinberg, 
Mounts, Lamborn, & Dornbusch, 1991). Potentially, parental control is more likely to be perceived 
as legitimate by adolescents in such a climate (Darling & Steinberg, 1993; Kuhn, Phan, & Laird, 
2014). Likewise, negative dynamics between parenting and delinquency could occur more often 
among low-SES parents who may be more likely to respond to negative behavior with coercive 
parenting (Conger et al., 1994). Speculatively, high-SES parents may thus be more successful in 
exercising parental control by providing structure, whereas low-SES parents could more often use 
pressure, thereby instigating feelings of intrusion among adolescents (e.g., Soenens & 
Vansteenkiste, 2010). In addition, especially low-SES parents could become overcontrolling when 
their children become delinquent. 
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Despite this uncertainty about the explanatory mechanism, this study s within-individual 
analyses suggest that monitoring could be less effective in low-SES contexts. Although such causal 
inferences remain speculative without an experimental design, this study s within-individual 
analyses may come slightly closer to causality than between-individual models by for example 
controlling for all time-constant third variables (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009; Voelkle, Brose, 
Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2014). Hence, monitoring could contribute to the relation between 
SES and delinquency by being both less often exercised and less effective for low-SES adolescents.  
Strengths and Limitations 
Strengths of this study include the use of multi-informant data and analyses that distinguish 
between- and within-individual effects. A first limitation was that most respondents had an above 
average SES, for example due to the exclusion of single parent families. Caution is therefore 
warranted in generalizing findings to more extreme low-SES contexts. Because the Netherlands is a 
prosperous nation with a well-developed social security system, caution is particularly warranted in 
generalizing this study s findings to the poorest families and neighborhoods in the United States. 
Instead, this study might better be translated to the American context as a comparison between 
lower middle class and higher middle class families. Second, this study investigated associations, 
rather than bidirectional effects. Although it is known that monitoring and delinquency may be 
reciprocally related (e.g., Keijsers et al., 2010), this study instead focused on distinguishing 
between- and within-individual effects. We partly interpreted our findings in terms of child-driven 
effects (i.e., from delinquency on monitoring), but it should be emphasized that our statistical 
design did not allow us to distinguish such reversed effects from those of monitoring on 
delinquency. Future research is needed, preferably with more waves and smaller time intervals, to 
assess both research questions simultaneously. 
Conclusion 
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Despite these limitations, this study challenged the idea that monitoring is more effective in 
high-risk contexts by demonstrating a within-individual interaction between parental control and 
SES in the opposite direction. Low-SES adolescents, but not high-SES adolescents, offended more 
during periods in which their parents exercised more control than during other periods with less 
control. This suggests that parental monitoring could be least effective when needed most. Low-
SES parents might not use monitoring effectively and become overcontrolling when their child goes 
astray. 
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Endnotes 
1The study by Anonymous [blinded for peer review] (2015) was a reanalysis of an earlier 
study (Anonymous, 2009) conducted on the adolescent reports in the first four waves of this study s 
2001 cohort, reaching a total of 1308 observations. The present study was conducted on the full 
dataset of 4290 observations and uses all reporters. 
2At wave 3 and 4 of the 2001 cohort, adolescents reported on both parents simultaneously. A 
comparison between these scores and scores that were reported for mothers and fathers separately 
revealed no discontinuities in mean levels, associations across waves, or associations between 
constructs. 
3Fixed-effects models were estimated using an unconditional negative binomial regression 
estimator with dummy variables to represent the fixed effects, since conditional negative binomial 
models may not exclusively capture within-individual variation (Allison & Waterman, 2002).  
4There are at least three conceivable causal sequences between the constructs under study: 
Monitoring -> Disclosure -> Delinquency (1), Delinquency -> Disclosure <- Monitoring (2), and 
Delinquency <- Disclosure -> Monitoring (3). Controlling for disclosure while estimating effects of 
monitoring on delinquency would only improve estimates if the third causal sequence (i.e., common 
cause) is accurate. If either the first (i.e., mediational chain) or the second sequence (i.e., collider 
effect) is correct, controlling for disclosure would contrarily bias the total effects of monitoring on 
delinquency (Pearl, 2000).  
5In the calculation of respondents  across-wave mean score, missing values were replaced by 
a predicted score from a regression model in which the score on the wave with missing data was the 
dependent variable, and the score on the previous wave was the independent variable. In addition, 
mean scores for the 2001 cohort were corrected for the absence of the first two waves, using 
coefficients that were obtained from a regression analysis on the 2005 cohort. Correlations between 
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adjusted and unadjusted scores varied between r = .97 and .99 across variables. An exploratory 
analysis with unadjusted scores revealed no meaningful differences with the reported results.    
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Effects as estimated in between-individual models 1 (control) and 3 (disclosure) and 
within-individual models 2 (control) and 3 (disclosure). Estimated levels of delinquency are 
unique for each respondent and each year in the within-individual model. This graph therefore 
depicts effects for a hypothetical respondent and year, with delinquency close to the mean 
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Appendix B 
Linear regression models predicting adolescent disclosure 
 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Coefficients are unstandardized with standard errors in 
parentheses. Dummy variables controlling for cohort, questionnaire type, wave, and respondent 
(i.e., fixed effects) are omitted from the table. 
 
 Between-individual Models Within-individual Models 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Gender: Female 0.46 (0.06)*** 0.46 (0.06)***    
Socioeconomic Status 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)    
Parental Solicitation 0.52 (0.03)*** 0.52 (0.03)***  0.23 (0.02)*** 0.23 (0.02)*** 
Parental Control -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)  -0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
SES*Solicitation  0.00 (0.03)   -0.01 (0.02) 
SES*Control  -0.01 (0.03)   0.04 (0.01)** 
Disclosuret-1    0.09 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 
Model      
Respondents 812 812  794 793 
Observations 812 812  3002 2999 
R2  34.2% 34.3%  15.8% 16.2% 
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